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1. The SOCTA 2017 marks a further step in the evolution of a con-
solidated European security strategy against serious crime and 
organised crime. Pursuing these phenomena requires not just an 
account of current situations, but a forward look at potential devel-
opments that are framed not simply in terms of law enforcement 
practice, but in a wider societal context. In particular, and as re-
ferred to in the commentary on the SOCTA 2013, maintaining the 
balance between security and freedom represents a fundamental 
challenge in the context of the rapidly changing social, political and 
criminal context. Whilst recent political events have dominated 
the European security landscape, it is important to also recognise 
the lived experience of contact with criminality by European citi-
zens, which may be removed from the headline grabbing dramatic 
event.  Even ‘organised crime’ – a highly flexible construct – is often 
far more mundane than the dramaturgical killings and extortion 
that dominate the popular imagery.
2. In our view, policy-makers and politicians need to have a much 
greater awareness and understanding of the changes in the nature 
of criminal activity, and associated political and social changes that 
Europeans are experiencing. The relationship between terrorism 
and organised criminal activity, for example, has always been ap-
parent, but that relationship may well be shifting in dangerous 
ways. Analyses of these phenomena need to be brought togeth-
er in clearer integrated ways, and structures developed to enable 
that to occur at a European level. As noted in our comments on 
the SOCTA 2013, policy makers need to ensure that areas of crimi-
nal activity (including terrorism) are looked at as a whole, and that 
analysis is not limited by artificial geographical or administrative 
boundaries. Responding to this is, in the first instance, not a law 
enforcement issue; it requires an expression of political will. 
3. Our comments on the SOCTA 2013 stressed the dangers associated 
with globalisation, and the rapid dissemination of criminal practise 
through digital technologies. The SOCTA 2017 broadly justifies that 
concern. However, it is less clear that policy makers and law en-
forcement agencies have fully appreciated the significance of the 
adaptive criminal dynamics offered by these societal changes, and 
the difficulties that they pose for states individually and collectively 
in regulating their negative social effects.
4. More specifically, there is consistent and widespread concern 
across the EU institutions and Member State governments about 
the negative impacts that organised crime has upon the security of 
individual citizens, communities, businesses and Member States. 
Though it is clear that the forms that organised crime takes, and 
the threat it poses for MS, varies within and outside the EU, in a 
number of areas, suitable data to prepare informed estimates of 
cost and assessment of harm are lacking wholly, or in part, due 
to figures that are often produced via methodologies that render 
them unreliable. However, this does not mean that social harms 
cannot be identified, without producing imaginary numbers. For 
example, there are the human costs of collapsed bridges, buildings 
and roads due to bad construction combined with corrupt con-
struction contracts:  commonplace in developed and developing 
countries where mafia-style OCGs with political connections are 
able to monopolise large public contracts, including those from the 
EU. The economic and social costs of organised crime activities far 
exceed the illegal profits generated by them, to which we should 
add the social anxieties of citizens who have no one they can turn 
to deal with exploitation, and the destruction of entrepreneurial 
drive that such criminal monopoly or oligopoly creates.  
5. In our view, policy-makers need to ensure that they track possible 
counter-productive effects of policies. The thousands of deaths of 
aspirant refugees and economic migrants in the Mediterranean 
Sea well illustrates this point – and the dilemmas faced by Euro-
pean policy-makers. Having pledged to protect and foster human 
rights, the EU and its Member States thus have the responsibility 
to monitor and minimise the harmful unintended consequences 
of their policy choices, keeping also in mind that criminalisation 
and prosecution are not the only or necessarily the best strategy 
for dealing with the harms of organised crime groups and their ac-
tivities.
6. The level of organised criminal groups’ flexibility depicted in the 
SOCTA 2017 becomes especially apparent with regard to the field 
of CaaS. In the light of this, and the activities of intelligent perpe-
trators who use the Darknet for criminal activities such as offering 
malware, for example, suggests that a new generation of criminals 
and inter-criminal relationships has emerged. Experience suggests 
that the individuals engaged in these activities often work together 
in loosely organised and de-personalised networks in which trust is 
more important than hierarchy and cutting people out of networks 
or (where counter-parties are reachable) violence is the primary 
means of enforcing one’s objectives. This is a growing trend which, 
whilst not supplanting traditional hierarchically organised groups 
in those places where they exist, does seem to be of growing sig-
nificance in some areas of criminality.
7. The SOCTA correctly refers to the lack of harmonisation of law and 
failures in implementing international standards as a possible ob-
stacle to the effectiveness of criminal investigations. Law enforce-
ment communities often do not adequately consider the contiguity 
between economic and organised crime. Both forms of crime are 
not mutually exclusive phenomena. The possibilities/advantages 
of cooperating with legitimate business in the prevention of organ-
ised crime are not, in our view, sufficiently considered. The applica-
tion of Know Your Customer Principles should become the guiding 
principle beyond the area of money laundering, and we need to 
find ways of better protecting both individuals and businesspeo-
ple who find it difficult to translate their abstract knowledge about 
scams into actual behaviour. This is not a task for law enforcement 
alone.
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8. The old categories of cybercrime, organised crime and white-col-
lar crime – once apparently different - have come under increased 
questioning in recent years and will continue to do so over the life-
time of this SOCTA, as criminal actors and networks overlap and 
are shown to overlap.  There is no evidence that there has been a 
diminution of ‘old’ organised crime activities, but the role of dig-
ital technology in enabling newer predatory frauds and extortion 
from a distance is now clearer, offering great challenges to the 
‘pursue’ role of the police across borders and stimulating the need 
for ever-closer public-private sector collaborations to cut down 
the elapsed time for crime reporting and to reduce the harm from 
cyber-enabled frauds by lowering the number of victims they can 
acquire.
9. Many of the things that organised criminals do are acts that are 
servicing illicit demands, such as illegal drugs and tax-free alcohol 
and cigarettes, as well as the desire to move to EU countries.  How-
ever, other acts are targeted at victims, and the demographic shifts 
mean that there is a significant older population with liquid or liq-
uidatable assets who are concerned about their future prosperi-
ty and the low interest rates on savings currently available.  They 
are prime targets for both online and offline fraudsters.  The most 
publicised scams are online ones, but there are many people tar-
geted via affinity groups and mailshots who may become multiple 
victims of a range of fraudsters, sometimes connected with each 
other, sometimes not.  More needs to be understood about these 
patterns of fraud networks and offender-victim relationships, and 
this is an area of organised crime that merits sustained attention 
at an EU-level.  Important as border security is, many economic 
crime harms require more than a concern about it, as threats can 
emanate from communications and trade that is both intra-EU and 
cross-EU border without being easily identifiable as criminal.
10. Europol and law enforcement generally have sought to develop 
their relationships with the private sector, appreciating that the 
private sector have some of the intelligence and levers for preven-
tion that are needed for combating organised crime. There remain 
issues of competing interests in objectives, but we welcome the 
appreciation that organised crime harm reduction can be striven 
for in multiple ways, including the private sector but also govern-
ments and the EU as regulators, encouraging pro-social develop-
ments by using administrative as well as criminal justice measures 
holistically.
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